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Abstract

Sports analytics have become a major part of how many sports fans enjoy the games they love.
The trend has touched sports from football to cricket. One aspect of football that has been less
discussed is punting. The current standard metrics, gross yardage and net yardage, give an idea
of how a punter performed in a given season, but they also may be skewed by a number of
factors, such as the skill of the offense or the punt coverage team. In this paper, we will look at
some previous attempts to measure punting prowess, and then further develop a metric to reward
punters for their skill while accounting for uncontrollable factors such as long returns and
penalty yardage.
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The Effectiveness of Professional Punters
The Sports Analytics Revolution
Sporting events and competitions have been a part of human life for so long that their
origins have been shrouded by the passage of time (Kyle, 2014). Despite this, statistics in sports
are a relatively new phenomenon. Through the nineteenth century, sports grew more structured
with the rise of school sporting events first and then highly organized amateur competitions
(Holt, 1989) such as the Football Association in England and the National Association of Base
Ball Players in the United States. In these more complicated team sports, players, managers, and
fans looked for ways to better measure and understand the skill of competitors. It is simple
enough to see how effective a wrestler or runner is. It was quite obvious, for example, that
Aquilo, a Roman chariot horse, was successful because he, “won 130 races for the Red circus
faction” (Golden, 2004, p. 14). He won, and so he was good. However, in team sports such as
baseball, football, rugby, or basketball, it can be more difficult to determine the value of
individual players. As a result, certain statistics began to be tracked and others were invented.
Hits in baseball were recorded. To give a better comparison of success between players, the
batting average was invented, dividing the number of hits by the number of opportunities to hit.
After organized football began in the 1920s, players were given credit for the number of tackles
they made or the number of yards they gained in various manners.
For a long time, these statistics remained this simple. While the National Football
League (NFL) made sacks an official stat in 1982 (Weinreb, 2010) and Major League Baseball
(MLB) began tracking on base percentage in 1984 (On-base percentage, n.d.), these additions
were just minor adjustments to existing formulae. However, it would take outside individuals to
begin developing more advanced sports statistics. One such effort, whether in an attempt to
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better quantify candidates for the Hall of Fame or the search for better team building tools, was
the Society of American Baseball Research (SABR), founded in 1971 (Costa et al., 2008). From
there, the world of sports analytics expanded in every which way, enveloping every major
modern sport from football to cricket.
Sports Analytics in Football
One of the challenges that football presents is that it is a significantly more complicated
game than baseball. While batting, fielding, or pitching achievements are largely attributable to
an individual, each play on a football field heavily involves many players (Pasteur et al., 2018).
At the very least, on any given play the failure or success of any of the five offensive lineman,
three or four defensive lineman, and the quarterback are all intrinsically linked with the failure or
success of the play. Furthermore, the relative success of a play is related to the situation it occurs
in (Chait, 2004). Clearly, a first down late in the fourth quarter of a close game is much more
important than a similar play in the first quarter.
Despite the challenges, there have been many efforts to quantify football performance.
One of the earliest popular examples was developed by Football Outsiders, an advanced metrics
company, in 2003. They introduced Defense-Adjusted Value Over Average (DVOA), their
method of evaluating teams, units, or players (Methods, n.d.). Essentially, DVOA takes the
outcome of a play and compares it to the league average outcome in similar situations. This was
followed by similar ideas such as Expected Points Added (EPA) and Win Probability Added
(WPA), created by Advanced Football Analytics. These statistics also measure the value of
particular plays. We will discuss EPA at a later point, but WPA takes the difference between a
team’s probability to win before and after a given play (Burke, 2014a). If, for example, a given
pass increases a team’s win probability from 0.44 to 0.47, that play is assigned 0.03 WPA. It
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should be noted that neither of these statistics attempt to assign credit to individual players. It is
the outcome of the play as a whole that is assigned WPA.
Other efforts have been made to evaluate individual players. One such attempt by
Advanced Football Analytics is the Tackle Factor (TF). TF is the percentage of a team’s total
tackles that an individual defender is credited for, adjusted for the number of games played
(Burke, 2014b). This is a fairly simple and intuitive statistic, but it has its limitations. One such
limitation is that TF “tells us something very different about defensive backs than for lineman
and linebackers” (Burke, 2014b, para. 8). If a cornerback has a significantly large percentage of
a team’s tackles, it may indicate he is not very effective in pass coverage. For a safety, a high TF
may mean the defense in front of him is letting a higher proportion of runners get to the second
level. These issues highlight just how difficult it can be to assign single numbers to a football
player’s output due to the complexity of the game.
The one possible exception to this rule appears to be field goal kicking. Osborne and
Levine (2017) employed several weighting schemes for a shrinkage model used to assign value
to individual kickers. They found that in general, when the stadium was taken into
consideration, their results agreed with a kicker’s field goal percentage. This is likely due to the
fact that relatively few players influence a field goal attempt. The snapper and holder must both
perform their jobs well, but at the NFL level, it is very rare that any of the offensive blockers
allow the defense to influence the kick. That being said, the 21 non-kicking players on the field
still may have an impact, even if it is very rarely.
Punting Metrics
While there have been metrics developed for nearly every aspect of football, one of the
more neglected areas has been punting. This is possibly because it is one of the least glamorous
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activities, perhaps only behind long snapping. The two main methods of measurement, gross
punting yards and net punting yards, are basic and relatively intuitive. Gross yards are simply a
measure of how far the ball traveled past the line of scrimmage. Net punting yards are only
slightly more involved; simply subtracting from gross punting yards any return yardage the
receiving team gains. These naturally give rise to gross yards per punt and net yards per punt.
Both of these statistics are quite flawed as they “are significantly impacted by field position, and
also fail to take into account hang time and the directional ability of a punter” (Zodda, 2016a,
para. 1). Additionally, there are several other factors out of a punter’s control that may affect his
statistics.
Two additional traditional metrics exist. In box scores, punters are given credit for the
total number of their punts that land inside the 20-yard line. The other measure, hangtime, is
generally not officially reported, but is often referenced by broadcasters (Pasteur, et al., 2018). A
longer hangtime indicates that the punted ball is in the air longer, and so affords the punter’s
teammates more time to get into position to make a tackle. Much like gross and net yardage,
these numbers do provide usable information, but they must be treated with caution as several
non-punter factors can influence them.
Punting Factors
All four of the above statistics may be affected by the quality of the team around the
punter, either for positive or negative outcomes. There are two main aspects of the team around
the punter that may affect punters. Neither of these are accounted for by traditional metrics.
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Relative Strength of the Offense
A relatively good or bad offense leads to different punting scenarios for punters, which
results in varied gross and net punt yardage. A punter with a weak offense is more likely to find
himself punting from deep in his own territory. This allows for large gross punting numbers, as
the punter can simply focus on kicking the ball as far as he can. A punter with a stronger
offense, however, is more often faced with the task of pinning his opponents deep in their own
territory. The punter in this case has much less field to work with. He also must try to avoid
kicking the ball into the endzone, which results in the ball being placed at the 20-yard line. This,
while not a tragedy, is not the most ideal outcome.
Additionally, a punter with less space to work with can focus more strength on getting a
ball high into the air, while if he is backed up on his own side of the field, that strength must be
used more horizontally. In this way an offense can affect average hangtimes. Thus, two punters
with varyingly successful offensive teams will likely have different statistics, even if they have
the same level of skill.
Skill of the Punt Coverage Team
In a similar way, a better punt coverage team will increase a punter’s net yardage in two
ways. To begin with, a better coverage team will tackle the returner sooner, limiting how many
yards are taken off from each punt. Additionally, they may be more skillful at downing the
football before it bounces into the endzone for a touchback. This clearly can have an effect on
the number of punts inside the 20 a punter has, but skills in both of these areas also could lead to
an increase in a punter’s net yardage in a way that does not account for the punter’s skill, while
deficiencies could unfairly punish the punter. Zodda (2016a) gave an example showing that
there are instances where net punting has almost nothing to do with how the punter performed.
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While this is anecdotal evidence, the play in question does show that the punter can do his job
quite well while not receiving any credit from traditional statistics.
Playing Conditions
The weather in which the game is played can have a significant effect on punts. Colder
or warmer weather will affect both the pressure of the ball and how well it can fly through the
air. Rain, snow, or mud can slow down the ball and the punter. Perhaps most significantly, wind
can drastically change how similarly kicked balls fly, both for good and for ill. Combine these
direct consequences with any effects weather may have on the offense or punt coverage team,
and weather may be the most significant factor when it comes to punting.
Additionally, the altitude at which the game is played may have an effect on how far balls
fly. Naturally, a ball punted in a lower pressure environment will travel farther than a ball
punted in a higher pressure one when kicked with the same force. This may seem insignificant,
and it may well be for most NFL stadiums, but at the extremes, there may be a difference. The
New Orleans Saints home stadium is nearly a mile lower than that of the Denver Broncos. This
may result in a perceivable difference between equally skilled punters.
Value as Punts Near the Goal Line
Not every yard on a football field is of equal value. Clearly, gaining the last five yards
before the endzone is of more value than gaining five yards in the middle of the field. Similarly,
a punt that travels only 40 yards, but lands on the opponent’s five-yard line is more valuable than
a punt that travels 40 yards and lands on the opponent’s 15-yard line. Properly valuing these
yards is one of the main difficulties of valuing a punt. This is where the idea of target lines
begins to have merit. If that target line is created by some sort of league average, we are able to
get some idea how much value a specific punt provides. That being said, a performance that is
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5% better than average near the goal line may still be of greater significance than a similar
performance in the open field. However, despite the difficulties, there are useful and innovative
ways to account for this.
Analytic Attempts to Quantify Punting
With these factors in mind, several statistics have been developed to account for them.
The authors of these metrics range from academics to fans with an intense interest. The
following are some interesting efforts.
Expected Points Added
We must begin our discussion with Expected Points Added (EPA), which is traditionally
an incredibly useful metric, but also a terrible way to measure a punter’s skill. Romer developed
a method to calculate how many points on average certain decisions would add to a team’s score
(2006). He did this in an effort to quantify when teams should attempt to convert fourth downs.
As a result, he had to quantify the alternative, which, in one case, means punting the ball away.
After designing a function to value expected points added from virtually every scenario,
he netted the opponent’s expected points against the kicking team’s expected points if they had
converted, or failed to convert, the first down. This leads to a measure of how much the decision
to punt affected the game. However, giving the ball away, no matter how prudent the decision
is, will almost always lead to negative EPA value, particularly on fourth and one. The odds of
converting a first down in such a scenario are so great, while the effects of giving the ball away
so negative, that no matter what the punter does, EPA does not favor him. Furthermore, Romer’s
methods account for the time of the game, the current score, and other factors that are out of a
punter’s control (EPA/punt, 2020). This is largely because EPA was developed not as a way of
measuring punting ability, but as a way to help guide a coach’s decision-making process.
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EPA does not value specific punts based on their distance and landing points. It
compares the value of having the ball at a specific location versus the opponent having the ball at
another location, but it does not value the punter’s work based on where he kicked the ball from.
Neither does it award the punter independently of any other forces that are outside of the punter’s
control. However, this measurement has been used elsewhere in conjunction with other means to
help quantify a punter’s success.
A Flight Based Metric
Pasteur et al. (2018) used Romer’s work in an effort to quantify the value of punts as they
near the goal line. They charted the results from all punts in the 2013 season visually, using the
NFL’s online video service to track landing points, ending points after bounces, hang time and
other factors. They also collected data about the weather for each game and added any penalty
data onto the result of the play that was not listed in their play-by-play sources. Using this data,
they model the effects that these elements have on punts. For example, they found that an
average punt in the NFL in 2013 included 0.86 penalty yards against the return team. Doing
similar calculations, the authors endeavored to eliminate confounding factors such as the
aforementioned penalty yards, return yards, distance the ball bounced and rolled after its flight,
and any weather effects.
Once these confounding factors are added or subtracted from a punt, the landing spot of
the kick is compared to the league average landing spot of balls kicked from the same yard line.
Specifically, the Expected Points of an opponent’s drive from the expected landing spot is
subtracted from the Expected Points of the adjusted landing spot. These Expected Points were
both aggregated over the whole season and used to calculate Expected Points per punt.
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Tymins’ Expected Points
Tymins (2014) also developed a method to use Romer’s EPA to measure punting success.
To begin, he first found the league average yard line for the next play from scrimmage for a punt
from each yard line. This gives punters a target against which their individual punts may be
compared to. Already seen in Pasteur et al.’s (2018) method, this is a common idea that takes
several forms and will be returned to later in many other statistics. As previously noted it does
not suffice to compare the target line to the actual outcome, as each yard of a football field is of
differing value. Much like the previous study, Tymins (2014) nets the expected points of a drive
that starts at the target line against the expected points based on where the actual drive began.
Again, these expected points can be accumulated over a season or examined on a per punt basis.
The Punt Runts
The Punt Runts are a group of Yale University students who have taken to developing
punting metrics in their spare time (Puntalytics, n.d.). They use nflfastR, a package of functions
used to analyze NFL play-by-play data (nflfastR, n. d.) to develop insightful looks into punting
skill. We examine two of their efforts
SHARP
The first attempt by the group was scrimmage help/hurt adjusted real punting (SHARP), a
metric that measures a kick by comparing it to the league average from each yard line (“Gross
yards,” 2019). After smoothing the average to eliminate noise, SHARP is determined by
dividing the gross yardage a punter earns on a kick by the league average gross yardage from the
original line of scrimmage. Thus, if the league average from a yard line is 50 yards and a kick
travels 40 yards, the punter is awarded a SHARP score of 80%. Over the course of a season, a
punter’s average SHARP is the main method of evaluation under this system.
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The main limitation of SHARP comes from the fact that it is inherently linked to gross
yardage, and therefore does not account for punt returns (SHARP, 2019). To challenge this
issue, net yardage may be used in much the same way to create SHARPnet. The combination of
these two statistics can give a decent idea about how punters rank relative to each other.
EPA/Punt
Following SHARP, the group developed a statistic based on Romer’s EPA called eraadjusted EPA above expected per punt. EPA is the standard statistic for many metrics in other
areas of football, but, as detailed above, it is not inherently useful for punting (EPA/punt, 2020).
They begin by averaging the EPA for a fourth down of any distance from a specific yard line.
For example, they found a fourth down on one’s own twenty-yard line, aggregated for all
distances to gain is worth -2 expected points, on average. Armed with these averages, they then
got a better comparison between the team’s situation before and after the kick. Thus, if the
resulting yard line gives the kicking team a situation where they have -1.3 expected points, that
number is subtracted from the original situation, yielding EPA for the punter.
This number was taken and compared to the league average of EPA from the yard line in
question. Thus, the punter earns EPA above expectations. This helps eliminate the negative
impact of a coach’s poor decision that traditional EPA would assign unfairly to the punter.
Rather than comparing the objective value the punter provided the team (which in some cases
can be negative), the statistic compares how the punter performed relative to other punters put in
the same situation. This leads to a metric that uses the team-centric EPA in a way to measure
punters specifically.
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Target Distance Punted
Target distance punted (TDP) measures a punter’s skill by comparing each punt to the
league average in whatever situation he is punting from (Zodda, 2016b), much in the same way
SHARP does. Developed by Chuck Zodda, a writer for Inside the Pylon and former kicker at
Dartmouth College (“Author”, n. d.), TDP first separates each punt into two categories: pin-deep
situations, which occur when punting from on or beyond the kicking team’s 41-yardline, and
open-field situations, which occur behind the kicking team’s 41-yardline (Zodda, 2016c). In
open field situations, the calculation of TDP is much the same as SHARP. So, a punt expected
to travel 50 yards that travels 55 receives 110% TDP, just as it would under SHARP.
In the pin-deep case, the target is no longer set at the league average result. Instead, the
distance of the line of scrimmage from the punter’s goal line is subtracted from 90. So, the target
distance when punting from the opponent’s 45-yardline would be 35 yards. Again, the gross
distance, less any yardage lost on touchbacks, is compared with the target. So, a punt from the
45-yardline that flies to the 10 would have a 100% TDP while punting the ball only to the 20
would result in approximately 71% TDP. The authors do not discuss using net yardage in the
same way, but considering the example of SHARP, this may be a reasonable extension.
The Cowardice Machine
Bois (2019) documented his quest to find the most cowardly punt in recent NFL history,
per his Cowardice Score. Trawling through all regular season punts from 2000 to 2019, he
judges each punt based on where it occurred on the field, what the score was at the time, how
much time was left in the game, and other situational factors. This score, like Romer’s work, is
more useful for deciding whether a decision was a good one or not rather than assigning success
or failure to a given punter.
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A New Statistic to Measure Punts
In light of the existing metrics, we believe there is more room for exploration. Many of
the metrics above are useful, but they have some limitations. Romer’s (2006) EPA, while a very
useful tool, is not enough on its own to measure the success of punters. It must be developed
more thoroughly to be useful.
We found the method developed by Pasteur et al. (2018) to be easily the most compelling
use of EPA. They also covered the many different confounding factors admirably and
effectively. The only limitation to their study is that it is quite time consuming and not easily
replicable by novices or even industry insiders. Computer code can be used to aggregate playby-play data, but the information they used involving weather and especially hang time was
much more involved. If one wanted to conduct a study by their methods over the previous five
years, they would need to take 3 measurements for each of the approximately 10,000 punts
launched over that time span. With motivation and money, it is certainly a doable task, and the
task would be made simpler if the NFL collected the data themselves as it was created, but we
find it difficult to imagine such an interest, either intellectual or monetary, exists for punting.
Tymins’ (2014) effort has the advantage of being more accessible than the previous
attempt. It retains the key use of EPA as the measure of comparison between target and reality,
while eliminating the many hours required to find weather, hang time, and bounce data. This
naturally leads to a weaker model, but depending on the audience, that may be a sacrifice worth
making. However, there is not much of an effort given to measure how well a punter did on a
specific punt. A punt that is returned for a touchdown, or even returned unusually far, may not
be the punter’s fault, but would still yield a poor evaluation from this method. Now this cannot
be completely accounted for, but there can be improvement. Furthermore, Tymins (2014) was
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not clear in how he calculated EPA for each yard line. By its nature, EPA takes into
consideration the score and time left in the game when assigning value. Thus, it would not make
sense to compare a punt in the fourth quarter to one in the first. It seems likely that Tymins
(2014) accounted for this, but it is not commented on in his work.
EPA above expected per punt is a useful, but not as strong an attempt as Tymins’ (2014)
work or Pasteur et al.’s (2018) flight-based metric. It is another useful way to assign credit to a
punter using EPA, but it ignores many of the factors previously discussed that are out of the
punter’s control. Specifically, using the next line of scrimmage fails to account for how any
returns or penalties may have affected the outcome of the punt. While a punter may be complicit
in allowing a large return, it is certainly never his fault alone. Thus, while useful, it is not
entirely effective in assigning value to just a punter. It is perhaps more suited to assigning value
to a punting unit.
The other effort from the Punt Runts (2020) suffers from a similar problem. Although
not linked to EPA, SHARP and SHARPnet both use the next line of scrimmage to assign value
without taking into account any other factors. So, while SHARP and SHARPnet are useful and
intuitive metrics, they can be improved upon.
TDP, like the metrics developed by the Punt Runts (2020) has a similar limitation. They
once again compare an outcome to a specific target without considering returns or penalties.
Furthermore, their target calculation in pin-deep situations seems a bit arbitrary. It certainly
works since every punt in this category is treated in the same way, but why subtract from 90?
Why not 85 or 80? Once again, this is not to say the statistic is useless, but only to point out a
potential short coming.
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A common theme appears to be present with the statistics. While they use some sort of
league average to determine a target for a punter, they do not account for any individuals the
punter may be dealing with. The returner may be particularly skilled, or a defender may make an
error that is quite out of the ordinary. Furthermore, penalties can have a significant impact on
where the receiving team starts with the ball. Pasteur et al. (2018) controlled for these, but the
rest of their work is a bit inaccessible. Thus, we believe there is room for a statistic that attempts
to control for these highly variable factors. However, the above metrics are not completely
without merit. Therefore, we propose a statistic that produces a target line while also accounting
for uncontrollable factors on individual punts.
Method
Using official gamebooks from NFL.com, we charted the outcomes of all 2,147 punts
from the 2019 regular season, excluding blocks and tips. This included noting kicked distance,
any return or penalty yardage, and changes due to muffs and fumbles. Using this data, we
developed two methods to model the expected outcome of each punt, which was then compared
with the actual outcome to assign value.
The General Method
Our first goal is to establish a target line for the line of scrimmage on the play subsequent
to the punt. To do this, we simply found the average new line of scrimmage league-wide after a
punt from each individual yard line. This is much the same approach as TDP, SHARP, or
Tymins’ (2014) method. However, due to confounding factors such as penalties and returns, it is
not sufficient to compare the actual outcome to this target. Therefore, we attached adjustments
to the actual line of scrimmage by adding or subtracting the league average for return yards,
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penalty yards, and changes due to muffs or fumbles. Table 1 contains a description of our
adjustments, where positive yardage favors the kicking team.
Table 1
Summary of Adjustments
Variables

Adjustments

Return yardage

3.50

Penalty yardage

-0.77

Muffs and fumbles

-0.01

Functionally, this leads to a 2.72-yard adjustment to the actual new line of scrimmage.
These adjustments help credit the punter for his work alone, while minimizing some of the effect
of his teammates and opponents on each specific punt.
It is once again not enough to compare the adjusted line of scrimmage to the target line.
This is because, as previously noted, not every yard is equally valuable. Much like Tymins’
(2014) work, we compare the Expected Points of the opponent’s drive based on the two starting
locations. Specifically, we used the expected points for a drive from each yard line with no time
run off of the clock in the first quarter. This eliminates the factors such as how much time is left
and what the score is that are used in usual EPA calculation. Thus, a punt from the 25-yard line
is expected to give the opponent the ball on their own 27-yard line with 1.59 Expected Points for
that drive. If a punt leads to a new line of scrimmage on the opponent’s 20, the opponent has 1
Expected Point for their drive. Thus, we would award the punter 0.59 Expected Points Above
Average (EPAA). Figure 1 displays the number of points expected based on a first and ten at a
given yard line.
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Figure 1
Expected Points v. Distance from the Goal line

Note. The line of best fit is given by y = 6.27 - .06x
The Specific Method
Our second method is much like the first, but it tries to account for the fact that a blanket
adjustment may not be prudent. For example, a punter is much more likely to have a kick
returned if he is punting from his own 1-yard line than from the opponent’s 40-yard line. In the
latter case, the most likely outcomes are touchbacks, the ball being downed by a teammate, or a
fair catch. Thus, it seems useful to calculate adjustments to be made for each yard line. In every
other way, this approach is the same, but the change in adjustments makes a noticeable
difference. Table 2 displays the top ten accrued EPAA over the 2019 season by starting punters
through both the general and specific method.
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Table 2
Top ten punters of 2019 by EPAA
Rank

Punter

Specific
Season
EPAA

EPAA/punt

Punter

General
Season
EPAA

EPAA/punt

1

Way, T.

13.97

0.176

Way, T.

14.05

0.178

2

Kern, B.

9.93

0.127

Kern, B.

11.23

0.144

3

Dixon, R.

8.71

0.126

Anger, B.

8.99

0.199

4

Huber, K.

7.91

0.105

Dixon, R.

8.83

0.128

3

Anger, B.

6.49

0.144

Huber, K.

7.1

0.095

6

Hekker, J.

5.95

0.090

Hekker, J.

6.92

0.105

7

Cooke, L.

5.19

0.069

Cooke, L.

6.88

0.092

8

Johnston, C.

3.81

0.053

Johnston, C.

5.27

0.073

9

Martin, S.

3.39

0.045

Morstead, T.

4.61

0.077

10

Morstead, T.

3.21

0.054

Colquitt, B.

4.59

0.075

Discussion
We believe this method of evaluating punters is intuitive, insightful, and relatively
simple. It helps control for factors out of a punter’s control, while also being accessible to
anyone with a background in R using nflfastR. Even this is not necessary, as we did our
calculations using Excel, but for anyone looking to investigate further, we highly recommend R,
as it saves immense amounts of time and energy. While not being as in depth and Pasteur et al.’s
(2018) methods, this relative ease of access is important for non-academics to use, understand,
and perhaps modify the approach.
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With that in mind, it is useful to examine the context that surrounds these statistics. If, by
our calculations, Tress Way contributed about fourteen points to his team over the season, how
valuable is that? An average NFL team scored 365 points over the course of the 2019 season
(2019 NFL Records, 2020). Thus, Way, on an average team, could be credited with providing
just under four percent of his team’s production. For context, Peyton Manning produced
approximately 43% of his team’s production in 2013 (Tymins, 2014). Considering how many
more snaps a quarterback is on the field for, this is not insignificant production from a punter.
Now, this is not an exact measurement, as a punter’s primary value is preventing the opponent
from scoring rather than aiding the offense, but it gives an idea of the scale these metrics are
dealing with. A fourteen-point swing over the course of the season is certainly of value.
Additionally, the nearly thirty-point difference between the best and worst punters by our metrics
is, based solely on how close most NFL games are, likely to affect the outcome of multiple
games per season. Examining how NFL teams value this production is an interesting study.
The most obvious way to approach how a team values a player is how much they pay
them. This is a bit of an oversimplification, but if a player is paid more, they must be valued
more. The most glaring exceptions to this rule are players still on their rookie contract. The
rules for rookie contracts are dictated by the NFL’s collective bargaining agreement with the
NFL Players Association, and they lead to a slotted amount the rookie can agree to, based on the
position he was drafted in. This contract lasts four or five years and can lead to a player who is
quite important to his team not being compensated as such. We will ignore players on rookie
contracts in the discussion for this reason. It should be noted that only 18 punters in 2019 were
not playing on rookie contracts (2019 punter salaries, 2020). If, as some people suppose, punters
are largely replaceable, this is to be expected, as teams have to pay very little for rookie talent.
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However, this may also simply reflect how short NFL careers are, meaning many players never
get to their second contract.
Using salaries provided by Over the Cap (2020), a business specializing in providing
NFL salary cap data, we investigated the earnings of veteran punters. The most surprising find
on a cursory inspection is that Way is 12th of the 18 veteran punters, making less than fifty
percent of the highest paying contract, despite being the best punter as measured by both general
and specific EPAA as well as EPA/punt. The highest earner, Thomas Morstead of the New
Orleans Saints, was not even in the top ten in either of our calculations. Another striking
observation is that the next two highest earners, Sam Koch and Dustin Colquitt, both had
negative EPAA through both the general and specific method.
In general, there seems to be little to no correlation between NFL spending, and a
punter’s performance. This may be due to NFL teams valuing things not measured by our
statistics, such as experience or leadership, but it may suggest that there is an inefficiency in the
punting market. Teams may want to consider paying some players more than what they are
currently making, while others may realize they have awarded a contract to a player that does not
match his on-the-field performance. Figure 2 gives a scatter plot of General EPA against
salaries. It can be quickly seen that there is very little order in the plot.
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Figure 2
General EPAA v. Salaries

Similarities to Other Work
Of note is the similarity of our rankings to those generated by EPA/punt. Both studies
used the 2019 season as their data set, and in general, both metrics agree on above average and
below average punters. While there is naturally some variation, both metrics put Way and Brett
Kern at the top of the list, while Corey Bojorquez and Chris Jones performed at or near the
bottom of the league. This similarity suggests there is merit to both methods and opens an
opportunity to consider how the NFL values these punters.
Furthermore, while unable to directly compare players’ performance, there is a similarity
between our methods and those of Tymins (2014), as could be expected given their relationship.
Specifically, the best and worst punters in Tymins’ (2014) study produced similar numbers to
ours. This, combined with the similarity of our results to EPA/punt, makes it seem very likely
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that punters are responsible for somewhere between -15 and 15 points for their team over a
season.
Limitations
The first and most obvious issue is with the specific method. In many cases, the sample
sizes from each yard line likely are not big enough to make a meaningful model. Most
egregiously, there was only one punt the entire 2019 season from the opponent’s 30-yard line. In
fact, no spots before the kicking team’s 10 or beyond the opponent’s 40-yard line had more than
19 punts to draw averages from. Between the 20 and 50 yard lines, this is not as big a problem,
with between 40 and 70 punts from each yard line, but as you get closer to either endzone, the
sample size drops off.
A sample of multiple years would help fix this problem, but likely only to a certain
extent. In the modern NFL, it seems very unlikely that researchers would get more than ten
punts from the opponent’s 30 over even a ten-year span. Furthermore, opening up such methods
to longer time periods can allow new confounding factors like rule changes and new playing
styles or techniques to take effect. As an example, it is not wise to compare a modern kicker’s
extra point percentage to a kicker from 20 years ago. The rules have changed to (in theory)
make an extra point more difficult. While such an effect may be less pronounced, punting has
still changed in significant ways in the last 20 years (EPA/punt, 2020). Therefore, this may be a
necessary limitation of this method.
That being said, the method is not without some merit. The average difference between
punter’s seasonal general and specific Expected Points is only 0.88 EPA, and the general method
does not suffer from the sample size issue. Furthermore, the overall rankings did not change
significantly. The largest swing was experienced by Mitch Wishnowsky, who lost 4.2 EPA from
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general to specific and dropped from 15th in the league to 27th. Wishnowsky was an exception
however, as he and Kern were the only players to experience a shift of more than 2 EPA. In
addition to the method being imperfect, there were factors that affect a punt’s outcome that we
did not consider.
Areas for Further Investigation
While we believe our metric is generally useful, there are some specific aspects of
punting that we were unable to measure. Some of these things might have fit well in our model,
such as how near the sideline a punt is fielded, but due to our data collecting restraints, we were
unable to include it. Others, however, such as catchability likely need their own investigation.
Punts Near the Sideline
One skill that every metric discussed does not consider is directional punting. To begin
with, a punt that goes out of bounds cannot be returned. It also cannot bounce or roll in an
advantageous direction, but given the shape of a football, predicting the way it will bounce is
difficult, if at all possible. However, it also seems reasonable to assume that a punt returner has
less space to work with when fielding a kick near the sidelines. Thus, it is possible that a punter
may mitigate some return yardage based on how near the sideline he places his punt.
It seems likely that this factor has been ignored by so many metrics because the data
needed is not readily available in play-by-play descriptions of games, either in information
provided by the NFL or by nflfastR. A study of this sort would have to take a similar shape to
that of Pasteur et al.’s (2018) work. While they used NFL film to calculate hangtime and other
data, another party could use the same service to chart where each punt landed with respect to the
sideline. While this would take a large amount of time and effort, it is an unexplored factor that
may lead to a new, better understanding of punting effectiveness.
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Catchability
New England Patriots’ head coach Bill Belichick has a well-documented affinity for leftfooted punters. In his time as head coach, the Patriots have employed almost exclusively leftfooted punters (Vrentas, 2018). With the natural scarcity of such punters, this cannot be a
coincidence. One common explanation is that a ball kicked with the left foot spins in the
opposite direction a right-footed kick would. Thus, a returner who is used to reading rightfooted spin may have more difficulty tracking a lefty’s punt, leading to an increase of muffs
(Vrentas, 2018). This may or may not be true, but it does suggest a question: can punters control
how catchable their punts are?
Johnny Hekker, the punter for the Los Angeles Rams, appears to experiment with such
ideas. Punters have long known about what they call a “banana punt” (Bien, 2018, para. 8).
Essentially, a ball can be dropped in a very specific way such that after it is kicked, ball curves as
it travels down field. This kind of kick is difficult enough that it is almost never used in a game
situation (Bien, 2018). This also suggests that a returner would have much more difficulty
tracking and fielding this sort of punt, as they must rarely see such kicks.
Finally, one more tactic a punter can employ is the knuckle punt. Much like a
knuckleball thrown by a baseball pitcher, a knuckle punt is a punt kicked in a way that sacrifices
velocity but can cause the ball to “change direction probably three or four times within the last
ten [to] fifteen yards [of flight]” (Petchesky, 2013, para. 3). Clearly, such action would make
fielding this punt a much more daunting prospect. Thus, it may be that field position is not all
that should be investigated when considering a punter’s worth. When examining one of
Hekker’s better banana punts, just considering the box score would tell you that it is a solid,
above average punt. However, factoring in the punting method, it is possible this kick was much
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more likely to be either muffed or not returned at all. Even if a punter can induce only one extra
muff a season, any NFL fan can tell you that a muffed punt can be the difference in a game.
Therefore, it may be worthwhile to investigate some sort of statistic that considers how often a
punter induces muffs. This may lead to more insight into how NFL teams pay punters than our
EPAA method does.
Conclusion
Both general and specific EPAA lend and insight into how effective NFL punters are.
They bridge the gap between the academic work of Pasteur et al. (2018), who model nearly every
conceivable factor, and other, less formal work which often overlooked important issues
regarding return length and penalty yardage. While punting and football statistics in general are
complex subjects, our methods lead to a relatively intuitive and understandable statistic that can
improve a fan’s experience by giving them a better understanding of the game they enjoy.
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Appendix A
Results

Table A1
2019 Punters Ranked by the Specific Method
Rank

Punter

Specific EPAA

EPAA/punt

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Way, T.
Kern, B.
Dixon, R.
Huber, K.
Anger, B.
Hekker, J.
Cooke, L.
Johnston, C.
Martin, S.
Morstead, T.
Gillan, J.
Wile, M.
Colquitt, B.
Bailey, J.
Winslow, R.
Dickson, M.
Bosher, M.
Allen, R.
Lee, A.
O'Donnell, P.
Long, T.
Sanchez, R.
Haack, M.
Wishnowsky, M.
Edwards, L.
Daniel, T.
Colquitt, D.
Koch, S.
Redfern, K.
Cole, A.
Berry, J.
Scott, J.
Wadman, C.
Pinion, B.
Jones, C.
Palardy, M.
Bojorquez, C.

13.97
9.93
8.71
7.91
6.49
5.95
5.19
3.81
3.39
3.21
2.22
2.19
1.89
1.41
0.78
0.67
0.33
-0.44
-0.84
-1.37
-1.55
-1.91
-1.92
-2.34
-2.37
-2.38
-3.16
-3.39
-4.59
-5.21
-5.87
-5.89
-8.29
-10.72
-10.79
-10.91
-14.07

0.177
0.127
0.126
0.105
0.144
0.090
0.069
0.053
0.045
0.054
0.035
0.365
0.031
0.017
0.130
0.009
0.037
-0.016
-0.014
-0.017
-0.032
-0.032
-0.028
-0.045
-0.027
-0.216
-0.066
-0.085
-0.510
-0.078
-0.079
-0.076
-0.106
-0.188
-0.216
-0.145
-0.178
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Table A2
2019 Punters Ranked by the General Method
Rank

Punter

General EPAA

EPAA/punt

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Way, T.
Kern, B.
Anger, B.
Dixon, R.
Huber, K.
Hekker, J.
Cooke, L.
Johnston, C.
Morstead, T.
Colquitt, B.
Martin, S.
Gillan, J.
Bailey, J.
Wile, M.
Wishnowsky, M.
Winslow, R.
Dickson, M.
Lee, A.
Bosher, M.
Sanchez, R.
O'Donnell, P.
Allen, R.
Long, T.
Haack, M.
Edwards, L.
Daniel, T.
Koch, S.
Colquitt, D.
Cole, A.
Redfern, K.
Scott, J.
Berry, J.
Wadman, C.
Pinion, B.
Jones, C.
Palardy, M.
Bojorquez, C.

14.05
11.23
8.99
8.83
7.1
6.92
6.88
5.27
4.61
4.59
4.41
4
3.39
1.92
1.86
1.71
0.87
0.64
0.2
-0.06
-0.2
-0.4
-0.47
-0.9
-0.94
-2.36
-2.52
-2.92
-3.54
-4.81
-5.66
-6.38
-8.85
-9.34
-10.34
-11.42
-12.61

0.178
0.144
0.200
0.128
0.898
0.105
0.092
0.073
0.077
0.075
0.058
0.063
0.042
0.320
0.036
0.285
0.012
0.010
0.022
-0.001
-0.002
-0.014
-0.010
-0.013
-0.011
-0.215
-0.063
-0.061
-0.053
-0.534
-0.074
-0.086
-0.113
-0.164
-0.207
-0.152
-0.160

